Did contracting effect the use of primary health care units in Pakistan? by malik, ashar muhammad et al.
eCommons@AKU
Community Health Sciences Department of Community Health Sciences
May 2017
Did contracting effect the use of primary health
care units in Pakistan?
ashar muhammad malik
Aga Khan University, ashar.malik@aku.edu
Ellen Van de Poel
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, J8-43, Burgemeester, Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
and.
Eddy Van Doorslaer
Institute of Health Policy and Management and Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University, J5-69, Burgemeester,
Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_chs_chs
Part of the Family Medicine Commons, and the Public Health Commons
Recommended Citation
malik, a. m., Van de Poel, E., Van Doorslaer, E. (2017). Did contracting effect the use of primary health care units in Pakistan?. Health
Policy and Planning, 1-10.
Available at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_chs_chs/302
Did contracting effect the use of primary health
care units in Pakistan?
Muhammad Ashar Malik,1,* Ellen Van de Poel2 and Eddy Van Doorslaer3
1Department of Community Health Sciences, Aga Khan University, W-110, Ibne-Ridwan Building, Stadium Road,
Karachi, Pakistan, 2Health economics research group, Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus
University, J8-43, Burgemeester, Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, The Netherlands and 3Health economics research group,
Institute of Health Policy and Management and Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University, J5-69,
Burgemeester, Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
*Corresponding author. Department of Community Health Sciences, Aga Khan University, W-110, Ibne-Ridwan Building,
Stadium Road, Karachi, Pakistan. E-mail: ashar.malik@aku.edu
Accepted on 15 March 2017
Abstract
For many years, Pakistan has had a wide network of Basic Health Units spread across the country,
but their utilization by the population in rural and peri-urban areas has remained low. As of 2004, in
an attempt to improve the utilization and performance of these public primary healthcare facilities,
the government has gradually started contracting-in intergovernmental organizations to manage
these BHUs. Using five nationally representative household surveys conducted between 2001 and
2012, and exploiting the gradual roll-out of this reform to apply a difference-in-difference approach,
we evaluate its impact on BHU utilization. We find that contracting of the BHU management did not
have any effect on health care use generally in the population, but it did significantly increase the use
of BHU for childhood diarrhoea for the poor (by 4% points) and rural (3% points) households. These
increases were accompanied by lower rates of self-treatment and private facilities usage. We do not
find any significant effects on the self-reported satisfaction with BHU utilization. Our findings contrast
with earlier small-scale studies that reported larger effects of the contracting of primary care in
Pakistan. We speculate that the modest additional budget, the limited management authority of the
contracting agency and the lack of clear performance indicators are reasons for the small impact of
the contracting reform. Apparently critical aspects of services delivery such as location of BHUs, inef-
fective referral system and medical practice variation in public and private sectors have contributed
to the overall low utilization of BHUs, yet these were beyond the scope of the contracting reform.
Keywords: Contracting-in, management contracting, impact evaluation, health econometrics, primary healthcare, difference-in-
difference
Key Messages
• Despite the introduction of various policies, the public primary health care remains heavily underused in Pakistan and
only accounts for less than five per cent of the aggregate demand for health care.
• We find little impact of the contracting reform on the use of Basic Health Units in Pakistan. This contradicts large effects
of the reform reported in previous studies.
• We do find contracting to raise the use of BHU for childhood diarrhoea by poor and rural households, and to lower rates
of self-treatment and private facilities use.
• The modest additional budget, the limited management authority of the contracting agency and the lack of clear per-
formance indicators are likely reasons for the small impact of the contracting reform.
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Introduction
In Pakistan, people are free to seek care from any type of health care
facility and any level of care. Private care is the most popular choice:
>60% of the aggregate demand for healthcare is provided by private
healthcare providers (Akbari et al. 2009). Public primary health care
caters to <5% of the aggregate demand of healthcare in Pakistan
(Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2005–2012). The first level of public
primary care is offered by Basic Health Units (BHUs), which pro-
vide essential preventive and curative care services and serve as a re-
ferral point to the next level of healthcare. The target population of
a BHU is around 10 000 people or a union council and/or within
a radius of five kilometres. A BHU is staffed with a medical doctor
and supported by a female trained birth attendant, vaccinators and
paramedical staff. A Rural Health Centre (RHC) represents the next
level of care, providing outpatient and some inpatient services
(Javed and Amin 2007). In 2012, there were 5449 BHUs and 556
RHCs (Government of Pakistan 2012) serving a population of 184
million. In the past decades, the government has used various strat-
egies to try to increase the utilization of care at BHUs and RHCs in
order to reduce the pressure on secondary and tertiary care hos-
pitals. These strategies included the construction of residences for
doctors and female staff in the BHUs and RHCs Planning
Commission, an enhanced non-salary budget for primary care facili-
ties (Planning Commission 1993), the implementation of a health
management information system to monitor progress (Afifi 1998)
and a raise in doctor salaries (Javed and Amin 2007). In 2000, the
government introduced the district government system in the entire
country. In the health sector, the district health department was
given autonomy in deciding over resource allocation, human re-
sources, and financial management (Anjum and Ahmad 2001). In
spite of all these reforms, the use of public sector primary healthcare
facilities has remained extremely low (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
2005–2012; Javed and Amin 2007; Malik et al. 2015).
As of 1999, the Rural Support Programs (RSPs),1 which are not
for profit joint stock companies (Batley and Mcloughlin 2004) man-
dated for rural development and poverty reduction through micro fi-
nance and other initiatives, were contracted by the provincial health
departments for the management of BHUs in selected districts. The
RSPs were given this contract without competition, reflecting the fact
that they were partly funded by the provincial governments and there-
fore could be trusted to be given public funds. A pilot was started in
Lodhran district, Punjab province, followed by a scaling up of the
model to Rahim Yar Khan (RYK) District in 2003 (Punjab Rural
Support Program 2008). A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
was signed between the government of Punjab’s health department
and the Punjab Rural Support programme (PRSP) which gave the
PRSP administrative and financial control over the management of all
BHUs in RYK. The MOU provided the PRSP with the autonomy to
implement organizational and management changes regarding the
BHU infrastructure, staff, budget and procurement of medicines.
PRSP introduced a number of changes in RYK such as (1) the recruit-
ment of managers on a market-based salary, (2) formation of clusters
of three BHUs with one doctor in-charge of the management, (3)
enhancing salaries of medical officers, (4) developing community sup-
port groups and (5) enhancing the BHU infrastructure through add-
itional funding from the Punjab government (Ali 2005; Loevinsohn
et al. 2009). Quarterly monitoring of the performance of the PRSP by
the health department was agreed upon, though no performance tar-
gets or sanctions/bonuses were included in the MoUs.
An initial assessment found the contracting reform to be associ-
ated with an increased use of BHUs of 54% (Loevinsohn et al.
2009), which led to a scaling up of the contracting reform to the na-
tional level. As of December 2013, 45% of BHUs across the country
were managed by this model.2,3 While the evidence on the impact of
this reform is positive, it only considers the first phase of the reform
and claims of causality are severely limited due to lacking baseline
data and problems of unrepresentativeness of the data (Loevinsohn
et al. 2009; Martinez et al. 2010; Tanzil et al. 2014). We review this
evidence in more detail in the next section. We contribute to the lit-
erature by evaluating the contracting reform using nationally repre-
sentative data covering both the pilot and later phases of the reform.
By comparing changes in health care use between districts that did
and did not get contracted, we are able to estimate the effect of the
reform, both for general ill-health conditions and for episodes of
childhood diarrhoea. In contrast to earlier studies, we find the con-
tracting reform to only marginally impact on the use of BHUs
among the poor [4% age points (pp)] and rural households (3 pp).
We hypothesize that the limited additional budget combined with
limited management authority of the contracting agency and lack of
clear performance indicators are reasons for the small impact.
Our findings have relevance beyond the Pakistan health policy
context, as many other low and middle income countries are cur-
rently experimenting with contracting in the health care sector.
While there is considerable enthusiasm for this approach, there is
still relatively little robust evidence on its impact (Loevinsohn and
Harding 2005; Palmer and Mills 2006; Liu et al. 2008).
Generalizing results across studies is difficult, because of the het-
erogeneity in the nature of contracts and contextual factors, such as
the managerial and financial capacity of the principal of the con-
tract. Mills (1998) and Siddique and Khan et al. (2006) have re-
viewed the success factors of contracting of clinical and non-clinical
services in in low and middle income countries. Some of the key as-
pects they identify are: (1) the influence of types and nature of con-
tracts, (2) level of competition, (3) organizational capacity of public
sector to manage contracts and (4) funding source of the contract-
ing. Generally, the limited evidence from low- and middle-income
countries to date suggests that performance-based contracts are
more effective than those that are not performance based (Liu et al.
2008), and that contracting models that provide a greater degree of
autonomy to the contracted agency are more effective than those in
which the contracted agency needs to operate within public sector
rules. There is limited evidence on the effects of contracting beyond
pilot phases.
The three most relevant examples of countries that have em-
ployed similar types of NGO contracting strategies to raise the util-
ization of public primary care on a large scale are Cambodia,
Guatemala and Afghanistan (Arur et al. 2010; Cristia et al. 2015;
Van de Poel et al. 2015). Since 1999, for the management of district
health services, a variety of contracting with non-governmental or-
ganisations (NGOs) has been implemented in Cambodia that link
payment to performance targets. A recent evaluation by Van de Poel
et al. (2015), using a similar difference-in-differences (DiD) design
as used in this paper, found that while contracting did raise the rate
of institutional deliveries (7.5%), effects are likely to be confined to
the non-poor and can be limited when the contracted agency is con-
strained to operate within public sector employment and procure-
ment rules (Van de Poel et al. 2015). Guatemala has used two
models of capitation-based contracting for basic health services in
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rural areas in 1995. Ministry of health, Guatemala contracted
NGOs to manage existing health setup of the ministry. In the other
model NGOs were the direct providers of the basic services. Using a
DiD approach, a recent evaluation, covering the first phase of the re-
form, confirmed a modest increase in the services uptake in manage-
ment contracts but no significant difference while comparing both
the models. First dose of vaccination of children increased by 9–
12% points and 10–11% points in management contracts and ser-
vices delivery contracts respectively. Results also showed a significant
increase in (1) the proportion (12% points) of pregnant women who
had received three doses of Tetanus Toxoid and (2) proportion (4%
points) of women who had used a modern contraceptive methods in
management contracting model then in the controls (Cristia et al.
2015). Afghanistan has used two different approaches of contracting
basic health services: contracting-out the management to NGOs, and
contracting-in, with the government contracting with the districts and
hiring technical support from NGOs. In 2006, 77% of the
Afghanistan population was provided basic health care through con-
tracting services. Also using a DiD technique, Arur et al. (2010) find
contracting to substantially increase the use of outpatient care (29%)
in Afghanistan, especially among the poor (41%), with little differ-
ences across the types of contracting (Arur et al. 2010). One of the
main differences between these schemes and the reform in Pakistan is
that in the latter no explicit goals or targets of the contracting reform
were formulated, nor was the budget linked to any kind of perform-
ance measure. Both of these contract characteristics are highlighted by
Loevinsohn et al. (2009) as important success factors.
The next section provides a more detailed description of the con-
tracting reform in Pakistan, as well as an overview of the existing lit-
erature. Thereafter we describe the data and empirical strategy used
to identify impact, after which we conclude and discuss the main re-
sults and policy implications.
Intergovernmental management contracting of primary
care in Pakistan
Contracting of primary healthcare in Pakistan is an indigenous re-
form that started in the province of Punjab. Afterwards it was grad-
ually rolled out to other provinces. Due to strong political will, the
reform was implemented and scaled up to 75 out of 113 districts in
the country.4 Theoretically the contracting reform should be seen as
a form of relational contracting with cooperation between intergov-
ernmental agencies rather than any legally enforceable obligations
(Palmer 2000). It involved a transfer of funds as well as management
to the inter-government agency RSP. The model is thus a hybrid of
intergovernmental and management contracting according to the
typology of Loevinsohn and Harding (2005).
The reform was widely criticized by the local medical commu-
nity (Ali 2012; News 2012). In some cases, doctors even refused to
be posted at the BHUs in reform districts (Ali 2005). One of the
likely explanations is that medical doctors are not allowed to have a
private medical practice while posted in BHUs managed by PPHI/
RSP (Ali 2005). Health departments were also reluctant to hand
over their authority to another agency (Ali 2005). None of the con-
tracted districts have however been back-sourced to the health
departments.
Figure 1 illustrates the gradual rollout of contracting by districts.
It was implemented by provincial health departments at the district
level. In the first phase a MOU was signed between the health de-
partments and the RSPs to take over management of BHUs in a dis-
trict. PPHI appointed a district manager who carried out renovation
and operationalization of the BHUs under the new management
(Figure 1).5 Once contracted, district health offices transferred the
annual budgets and the management of all BHUs to the contracting
parties, the provincial RSPs. Provincial and district health depart-
ments are the principals and they sign an MOU with the respective
provincial RSPs. Health department staff working at the BHUs were
seconded to the RSPs. They retain their salary level and civil servant
status, but the RSP is authorized to relocate staff from one BHU to
another and pay additional benefits according to management
needs. The RSP receive a grant-in-aid from the provincial govern-
ments to establish provincial and district support units (Khan 2010).
At the service delivery level, the contracted BHUs received a one-time
grant of PKR 100 000–150 000 (USD 1040–1560)6 for renovation
and repairs. The authority to take disciplinary action against the staff
seconded to RSPs is retained by the health department, but the RSP is
allowed to appoint additional staff on a contractual basis (Punjab
Rural Support Program 2008; Sarhad Rural Support Programme
2013). Public sector financial administration rules are replaced with
the RSP’s management system. For example, authority is granted to re-
allocate funds from one line item to another, to transfer savings to the
next year and to have an audit done by private audit companies
(Sindh Rural Support Organization 2009). RSPs are required to report
performance on key functions of the BHU on a quarterly basis to the
health department, but no performance targets were set in the contrac-
tual agreement. It was, however, agreed to have a third party evalu-
ation by the end of the first year on mutually agreed indicators.
Contracts between the government and RSPs were signed for fixed
terms with a possibility of extension (Punjab Rural Support Program
2008; Sindh Rural Support Organization 2009; Martinez et al. 2010).
Health departments, on the one hand, served as the principal, signing
MOUs with RSP and handing over BHUs to RSP, and on the other
hand emerged as a competitor to RSPs by providing services through
BHUs in districts that were not contracted to RSPs.
The evidence on the effects of contracting in Pakistan is limited.
It generally reports positive findings but it is limited in scope and in
its ability to make causal inferences. The RYK model was evaluated
with a case control research design (Loevinsohn et al. 2009) that re-
vealed the use of BHUs to be 13pp higher in RYK (35%) than in
Bahawalpur (22%), a neighbouring control district with a compar-
able socio-economic situation. In 2010, a commissioned study eval-
uated the reform in three provinces other than Punjab. A logistic
regression analysis comparing health care use in contracted and
non-contracted districts revealed the use of BHUs to be significantly
higher (odds ratio of 1.75) in contracted districts. Patient’s satisfac-
tion and observed quality of care were found to be 11 pp (36 vs
47%) and 15 pp (61 vs 76%) higher respectively in contracted dis-
tricts (Martinez et al. 2010).7 Finally, a study on the outsourcing of
BHUs in Sindh province compared volume and quality of services
provided at two BHUs in Thatta (contracted) and Karachi (control)
districts. The average daily number of outpatient visits was found to
be 166% higher in the contracted district (80 visits) when compared
with the control district (30 visits) (Tanzil et al. 2014).
In sum, the above studies suggest that there may have been posi-
tive effects of the contracting reform but they all relied on ex-post
comparisons of districts with and without contracting in the absence
of longitudinal data. It therefore remains difficult to causally attribute
any of the observed differences to the introduction of contracting.
Methods
We use data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standard
Measurement Survey (PSLMS) rounds of 2004–05, 2006–07,
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2008–09, 2009–10 and 2011–12 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
2005–2012), and from the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey
(PIHS) 2001–02 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2003).8 The total
sample size of the combined surveys is around 2.2 million respond-
ents; the sample size for variables reflecting whether people sought
care at BHU for unknown illness and childhood diarrhoea is
138 675 and 30 417, respectively. This gives us more power than
previous studies to detect any effects of BHU contracting.
Our approach relies on a comparison of trends in health care use
between districts that got contracted, referred to as the treated, com-
pared with those that did not, referred to as the controls. We con-
sider a district as treated if all BHUs in the district were fully
operational under the new management at the time of the survey.9
BHUs typically provide preventive and primary care. A BHU is
the focal point for most of the vertical primary health care programs
funded by the federal government on health promotion, immuniza-
tion and health education. We investigated the effects of contracting
primary health care on the probability of seeking care at a BHU for
unknown illnesses and more specifically for childhood diarrhoea in
the 4 weeks preceding the survey. Seeking care for childhood diar-
rhoea is reported in all surveys mentioned above while seeking care
at BHUs for unknown illnesses is only reported in the later Pakistan
Living Standard measurement Surveys (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
2005–2012). We distinguish between care sought at government
hospitals and clinics, private hospital and clinics, BHU/RHCs,10 al-
ternative and traditional healthcare providers, and pharmacies. We
also estimate the effect of contracting on self-reported satisfaction
with services availed from BHU in the wake of unknown illness, as
this information was not available for childhood diarrhoea.
Respondents who reported to have used services from a BHU were
asked whether they were satisfied with the services provided and the
reasons for dissatisfaction. Due to paucity of observations on the
various reasons for not being satisfied, we simply grouped the vari-
able into dissatisfied and satisfied with the services at BHU.
Descriptive evidence
Table 1 presents means of all outcome indicators for the 2001, 2004
(prior to the contracting-in) and 2012 surveys. Figure 2 presents trends
in the use of BHUs for childhood diarrhoea and common illness across
both the treated and control groups. It is clear that BHUs only account
for a very small proportion of the general health care use and the use
for childhood diarrhoea in both the control and treated group (going
from 1.5% in 2004 to 5.25% and from 2.25% in 2001 to 5.25%% in
2012, respectively). The trends suggest there to be a small effect of the
contracting reform on the use of BHUs for cases of childhood diar-
rhoea, though only in the initial phases of contracting.
Private hospitals/clinics are the most important source of health
care provision, accounting for over 60% of the use of general and
child health care. The proportion of respondents reporting to forego
care for childhood diarrhoea dropped from 18 to 8% between 2004
and 2001, which is probably related to the substantial increase in
private hospital/clinic use, which went from 48 to 63%, but re-
mained stable thereafter (65% by 2012). By 2012, the use of BHUs
for childhood diarrhoea has increased among the treated group (by
5pp) while it has remained stable among the controls. BHU use for
unknown illnesses also shows a small increase (of 2 pp) in the
treated group while it remained fairly stable in the control group
over 2004–12.
To assess the validity of our control group of districts, we com-
pare baseline differences and pre-treatment trends (2001–04) in out-
comes between both groups. Table 1 reports both means and
differences in means between treated and control for the two pre-
intervention years and the last survey year. Statistical significance of
the difference in means is assessed by t-tests, and by normalized dif-
ferences calculated as the difference in means divided by the square
root of the sum of the variance.11
Figure 1. Overview of the rollout of contracting across districts in the period 2001–13. Note: Vertical axis represents each of 114 districts in four provinces of
Pakistan. Horizontal axis indicates month and year of incomplete and complete contracting of the BHUs in districts or districts that remained with the provincial
government health departments. Once contracted to PPHI, districts were never back-sourced to the provincial health department
Figure 2. Trends in outcomes across treated and control Group (2001–12).
Notes: Treated/Control refers to districts that got/did not get contracted by
2012. No information on BHU use for general illness was available in the 2001
survey
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Differences in pre-intervention outcomes between control and
treated groups are generally small; most notable is a higher reliance
on private providers (when compared with public) for general health
care in the control group. While some of the baseline differences are
statistically significant (though none of the normalized differences
are larger than 0.25), we found no evidence of differential trends in
health care used for childhood diarrhoea in the 2001–04 periods.
Also Figure 2 illustrates that trends in the use of BHUs were very
similar across both groups prior to the contracting-in reform. The
final column, which provides evidence of the difference in trends be-
tween both groups across the full period (the uncontrolled DiD esti-
mate), suggests that there was indeed a significantly steeper increase
in the use of care at BHUs in response to childhood diarrhoea and
common illness in treated districts when compared with controls,
though the differences are relatively small in size, which can also be
seen in Figure 1.
Empirical analysis
We identify the impact of contracting-in with a DiD approach
(Wooldridge et al. 2009) which relies on a comparison of the trend
in the use of BHUs for contracted districts with the trend in non-
contracted districts. Identification of a causal effect relies on the as-
sumption that the trend in outcomes among the control districts pro-
vides a good counterfactual of what would have happened to the
treated in the absence of contracting, i.e. the parallel trends assump-
tion. Similarity in pre-intervention means and trends—as shown in
Table 1 and discussed in the previous section—lends some credibil-
ity to this assumption. Given the non-random rollout of the
contracting-reform it is, however, important to weaken the parallel
trends assumption by controlling for observable characteristics that
may have generated different trends across treated and control dis-
tricts. We therefore control for characteristics including demo-
graphic and socio-economic aspects such as gender, age of the
respondent (child in the case of childhood diarrhoea), educational
attainment of the respondent (head of household in case of child-
hood diarrhoea), whether a family is headed by a female, urban/
rural location and wealth quintiles derived from an asset index gen-
erated by principal component analysis.12 Summary statistics of
these variables can be found in the Supplementary Appendix table.
We estimate the following DiD model by ordinary least squares
for each of the outcomes of interest (Puhani 2012)13:
yidt ¼ bCCdt þ X idtXþDd þ st þ eidt (1)
where yidt is an indicator of whether the respondent (child) i used
health care from a specific provider (no care, private, public, BHU,
other, pharmacy). CCdt reflects whether or not the district was
(completely) contracted at time t. In our baseline analysis, we define
(complete) contracting as the date at which the BHUs were fully
operationalized by the contracting management. Xidt is a vector of
household level characteristics and Dd and st are district and year
fixed effects respectively, which, respectively, pick up the time-
invariant differences between contracted and non-contracted dis-
tricts and the general time trend in the use of BHUs that is common
to the contracted and non-contracted districts. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the district level. Our main interest lies in
the parameter b which reflects the average treatment effect of con-
tracting on the outcome of interest.
We also examine whether there were already any effects during
the transition period in which the management of the BHUs moved
from the health department to the PPHI by estimating two add-
itional models. In the first, we assume contracting to have started
earlier, at the date when the RSP appointed the district managers to
take over the management of BHUs from the health department.
The model specification is identical as in equation (1) but the (full)
contracting variable is replaced by the incomplete contracting vari-
able ICdtÞ (as determined by the date of the district manager ap-
pointment). In a third model, we add both variables (CCdt and ICdt)
[in equation (1)] to test for any differential effects of complete over
incomplete contracting.
As BHUs mostly cater to poor households residing in rural areas,
we also investigate the heterogeneity of the effect of (complete) con-
tracting across urban/rural location and poverty status14 by adding
interaction terms with the contracting variable and using the follow-
ing specification:
yidt ¼ @ Cdt þ c1CCdtpooridt þ c2CCdtruralidt
þ X idtUþDd þ st þ lidt (2)
The average effect of contracting on a sub-group, e.g. the poor,
is estimated by averaging the partial effect of contracting (CCdt)
across all observations in the sub-group that are exposed to con-
tracting. To examine whether effects differ significantly between
groups, we test the null hypothesis of no interaction between the
treatment and group indicator, e.g. c1 ¼ 0.
Results
Estimation results for three variants of model (1) on the effects of
contracting on the type of care seeking are presented in Table 2—
separately for childhood diarrhoea and for any unknown illness.
While we generally find negative coefficients on foregoing care and
on the use of private care and positive coefficients on seeking formal
public care, most of the estimated coefficients are very small and not
statistically significant. In the baseline model (1) for complete con-
tracting (CC), we find only one significant effect of complete con-
tracting: it lowers the probability of self-medicating from the
pharmacy in response to childhood diarrhoea by 2.6 pp. There is no
indication that the reform has achieved its main intended effect as
the coefficient for BHU use is small and not significant. In models
(1a) and (1b), we explore the effect of incomplete contracting (IC)
but in neither of these we find a significant positive effect on the
probability of seeking care from BHUs/RHC. Model (1a) only indi-
cates a significant increase in seeking care from other providers
(traditional medicine and spiritual healers) for unknown general ill-
ness, clearly not an intended effect of the contracting reform. We
find the same when we estimate the effects of incomplete and com-
plete contracting in model (1b): both have slightly reduced the likeli-
hood of not seeking any care for general illness but they have only
raised the likelihood to seek care from other providers, not from
BHUs/RHC.
In Table 3, we show some tests of the heterogeneity of effects of
(complete) contracting across urban/rural location and poverty sta-
tus. Most of the effects are again insignificant in both groups, but
now we do see that contracting has led to small but significant in-
creases in the use of BHUs for childhood diarrhoea for the poor (4
pp, 160% compared with the baseline of 0.025) and for rural (3 pp)
households. For unknown illness, we observe a small increase in the
probability of seeking care at BHUs for the rural population only
(1.5 pp). Similar to the results from the pooled sample, we find nega-
tive but insignificant effects on self-reported satisfaction with BHU
services in both subsamples.
In general, the estimated effects on BHU services use are quite
small in magnitude, and seem to be driven by a decline in both
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self-medication and in care seeking from private hospitals. Any health
impact of the reform is therefore likely to be small and also dependent
on the quality of services provided at BHUs. To gauge any effects of
the reform on quality of care provided at BHUs, we also used equa-
tions (1) and (2) to estimate effects on the probability that the child
was given ORS for his/her episode of diarrhoea when s/he was taken
to a specific provider. Because we did not find any significant effects,
neither in the pooled sample nor in the rural and poor sub-groups, we
can therefore not conclude that there has been a quality effect.
Discussion
Contracting NGOs for the management of primary health care de-
livery has been suggested to be an effective way of increasing the use
and quality of health care in low income countries (Loevinsohn and
Harding 2005; Palmer and Mills 2006; Liu et al. 2008). Over the
past decade, all four provincial health departments in Pakistan have
contracted RSPs to take over the BHU management with the aim of
increasing their performance. By 2010, 45% of the BHUs had been
contracted. Previous evidence on contracting in Pakistan
(Loevinsohn et al. 2009; Martinez et al. 2010; Tanzil et al. 2014)
reported contracted districts to have higher rates of utilization, but
all of these studies were based on district specific pilots, were rela-
tively small in scale and could not claim to have estimated a causal
effect.
Using a DiD approach we measure the impact of the nationwide
contracting reform over the period 2001–12. While we do not find
any effect on BHU utilization in general for the full population, we
do find (complete) contracting to have some effects on certain sub-
groups. It increased the probability of seeking care at BHUs for
childhood diarrhoea by 4 pp for the poor and by 3 pp for rural
households. This is not a surprise as the use of BHUs is still relatively
low and mostly confined to poor and rural areas. While the esti-
mated effects are small in absolute magnitude, they do represent
substantial relative increases compared with the very low baseline
rates of BHU utilization (0.025 for childhood diarrhoea and 0.021
for unknown general illness). We do not find any significant effect
on self-reported quality of care, or on the likelihood of receiving
ORS for childhood diarrhoea.
Our results therefore do not confirm the promises suggested by
earlier, descriptive studies. One possible reason for the discrepancy
could be the selection of particular treated and control districts in
previous (often pilot) studies. However, even when restricting our
sample to the districts and time periods studied in earlier papers, we
could not replicate the much higher rates of BHU use reported in
previous studies (results are available in Supplementary Appendix
S4, Supplementary data are available at HEAPOL online). The dif-
ferences in results are therefore likely to be driven by the unrepresen-
tativeness of the sample used in previous studies. For example,
Loevinsohn et al. (2009) could only sample two villages from every
district, with one being the closest to the BHU, leading to much
higher BHU utilization rates (34 and 22% of those reporting to seek
care in RYK and BH, respectively) when compared with the rates in
our nationally representative data (Supplementary Appendix S4,
Supplementary data are available at HEAPOL online). In the case
of Martinez et al. (2010) the selection of districts and BHUs was
non-random. Only the district with a middle socio-economic rank-
ing and with BHUs that did not have another public facility at a dis-
tance of <3 km were included in the sample (Martinez et al. 2010).
Tanzil et al. (2014) compared Thatta (treated) with Karachi (con-
trol), the former a rural and underdeveloped district and the latter a
metropolitan city with a population of over 18 million (Tanzil et al.
2014).
There may be several potential reasons for our findings. One
likely explanation for the limited impact that we observe is the weak
incentives for BHUs and RSPs that were included in the design of
the contracting reform. We could not find evidence of any additional
resources provided to treated districts apart from the one-time grant
for renovation of BHUs and some financial support to establish
management units at provincial and district levels (Bano 2008;
Loevinsohn et al. 2009; Sindh Rural Support Organization 2009;
Martinez et al. 2010; Tanzil et al. 2014). There were also no clear
performance targets set with the health departments. Furthermore,
RSPs could not take any action against the staff working on regular
salaries other than returning them to the health department if their
performance was not satisfactory. Van de Poel et al. (2015) argued
that such halfway houses have also existed in Cambodia in the early
phase of contracting, and are best avoided (Van de Poel et al. 2015).
Table 2. Effects of contracting on seeking care for unknown general illness and childhood diarrhoea
Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b
Complete contracting (CC) Incomplete contracting (IC) Complete contracting (CC) Incomplete contracting (IC)
Seeking care for unknown general illness
Did not seek care 0.007 (0.006) 0.014** (0.007) 0.014* (0.007) 0.017* (0.009)
At private hospitals/clinics 0.011 (0.016) 0.033 (0.026) 0.029 (0.023) 0.044 (0.043)
At public hospitals/clinics 0.010 (0.017) 0.020 (0.027) 0.019 (0.024) 0.022 (0.042)
At BHU/RHC 0.010 (0.007) 0.012 (0.008) 0.013 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009)
From other providers 0.011 (0.009) 0.028** (0.009) 0.026** (0.01) 0.036*** (0.007)
At pharmacy 0.013 (0.01) 0.012 (0.009) 0.015 (0.009) 0.005 (0.018)
Satisfaction with BHU 0.084 (0.084) 0.043 (0.081) 0.069 (0.092) 0.040 (0.087)
Seeking care for childhood diarrhoea
Did not seek care 0.006 (0.012) 0.001 (0.0121) 0.004 (0.013) 0.008 (0.0168)
At private hospitals/clinics 0.023 (0.026) 0.050 (0.032) 0.044 (0.0301) 0.071 (0.0544)
At public hospitals/clinics 0.019 (0.019) 0.031 (0.0247) 0.029 (0.0228) 0.035 (0.0418)
At BHU/RHC 0.022 (0.014) 0.019 (0.0129) 0.024 (0.0148) 0.005 (0.0139)
From other providers 0.002 (0.009) 0.010 (0.0088) 0.007 (0.0093) 0.017 (0.0129)
At pharmacy 0.027* (0.015) 0.009 (0.0173) 0.020 (0.016) 0.022 (0.0328)
This table shows coefficients from linear models including covariates as shown in Supplementary Appendix Tables S2 and S3. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
adjusted for clustering on the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels of significance, respectively. Model 1 includes variable on com-
plete contracting only, Model 1a includes incomplete contracting (IC) and Model 1b includes both contracting variables (CC and IC).
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Secondly, while contracting may have improved the management
of BHUs, it did not address many of the structural weaknesses of the
primary healthcare system in Pakistan. For instance, contracting or-
ganizations were not authorized to relocate BHUs that were not eas-
ily accessible to the target population. Bhatti (2005) reported that
67% of the BHUs in their study on geographical access of primary
healthcare facilities in the Punjab province were more than 5 km
away (on foot) from the target population (Bhatti 2005). Thirdly, in
Pakistan there is hardly any functional referral system for public sec-
tor health facilities. People directly visit tertiary care hospitals even
for common illnesses that can easily be managed at primary care
facilities if appropriate staff and medicines are available (Siddiqi
et al. 2001). While contracting did improve the availability of medi-
cines and doctors at BHUs, apparently this has not sufficiently im-
prove quality perceptions to deter patients to directly seek care at
secondary and tertiary care facilities. Finally, the differences in med-
ical practice at private and public facilities are not influenced by the
contracting. Due to lack of regulation, the private clinics are not
inclined to follow clinical practice guidelines (Shah et al. 2003;
Berendes et al. 2011). Poly-pharmacy, irrational use of medicines,
and overuse of injections and infusions are common commercial tac-
tics used by private clinics to attract more patients (Siddiqi et al.
2002; Basu et al. 2012; Raza et al. 2014).
Very recently, PPHI has been transformed into public limited
companies, independent of the rural support programs, in two prov-
inces (Sindh and Baluchistan). The new status provides greater au-
tonomy to expand services like, for example, the provision of
preventive care, nutrition services, obstetrics-related in-patient care
such as facility deliveries as well as other maternal and child health
services. On the management side, PPHI Baluchistan is introducing
performance based management and bidding for additional re-
sources to upgrade BHUs to provide 24/7 maternal and child health
services (PPHI 2014).
There are two important limitations to our study. First, our data
cannot distinguish between the use of health care at BHUs and at
RHCs, while the contracting reform was only targeted at BHUs. To
the extent that the contracting reform attracts more people seeking
care at the BHU first (rather than the RHC), our effect estimates
could therefore be biased downward. However, the combined use of
BHUs and RHCs appears too low (<5%) for this switching behav-
iour to be a likely explanation for the small impact. Second, as the
rollout of contracting did not occur in a randomized way, it is pos-
sible that there are some unobservable time-varying factors remain-
ing, such as different district policies and circumstances, that
correlate both with the contracting and health care use. The similar-
ity in pre-contracting trends and means does suggest, however, that
the parallel trends assumption is quite plausible.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results imply that the con-
tracting reform did not have a large impact on the use of public pri-
mary care. It seems imperative to critically review this reform.
Contracting has definitely contributed to the renovation of BHUs
and to ensuring all-year-round availability of doctor and medicines,
but this has not had a large impact on households deciding to make
use of BHUs when seeking care, except for some of the poor and
rural households. These findings call for additional research on
other determinants that may have affected this finding, including the
access and location of BHUs, the variation in medical practice in
public and private clinics and the effectiveness of the referral system.
Among the factors that seem essential to improve the effective-
ness of contracting are: (1) a competitive and transparent bidding
process, (2) explicit performance targets, (3) a well-designed pack-
age of service, (4) performance based incentives and (5) financial
and management autonomy to contracted NGOs. The new stage of
the reform implemented in two provinces would seem to provide
greater flexibility to refine the contractual relationship between the
government and the PPHI.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
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Notes
1. The National Rural Support Program (NRSP) works at the
national level while each province has provincial rural sup-
port program, e.g. Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP),
Sindh Rural Support Organization (SRSO), Sarhad Rural
Support Program (SRSP) and Baluchistan Rural Support
Program (BRSP) in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and Baluchistan provinces. These programs receive funding
from the government and classified as quasi non-
government organization (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2004).
2. As of June 2012, there were 113 districts in four prov-
inces, 36 in Punjab, 23 in Sindh, 24 in Khyber
Pukhtonkhwa and 30 in Baluchistan (source: Pakistan
Social and Living Standard Measurement Survey 2011–12,
Pakistan Bureau of Statistics).
3. In some districts RHCs and Maternal and Child health
facilities were also handed over to PPHI/CMPHI. As of
December 2012, there were 658 other health facilities
managed by PPHI/CMPHIC besides BHUs.
4. As of December 2013, 2441 BHUs and 658 other pri-
mary healthcare facilities were contracted-in in 75 districts
in four provinces and federal areas. In the three provinces
namely Khyber Pukhtonkhawa (KPK), Sindh and
Baluchistan this reform is now known as Peoples
Healthcare Initiatives (PPHI). In Punjab it is named Chief
minsters’ Initiative for Primary Healthcare (CMIPHC). It
has established a separate management structure at fed-
eral, province, division and district levels. After the enact-
ment of 18th constitutional amendment, the federal unit
of PPHI is dissolved.
5. The contracting process involved appointment of a district
manager, taking over BHUs, carrying out repair and reno-
vation and opening-up BHUs under new management.
This process was completed in around 1 year (median
1.09 years and interquartile range 0.26 years).
6. In 2015 USD to PKR official exchange rate.
7. This study reports much higher utilization rates of BHU
as compared to national statistics, likely related to the
fact that data was collected from BHUs in areas where
no other health care provider was available.
8. Sampling methodology of PSLM rounds 2006–12 allows for
representativeness of findings to districts, provinces and na-
tional levels. PSLM 2004–05 and PIHS 2001–02 surveys are
representative for population of provinces and national levels.
9. The process of contracting included a formal agreement be-
tween the district health department and the rural support
programs, the establishment of a district management office,
and the taking over of the BHU to become operational.
This process typically took about two years in each district.
We used the date of becoming fully operationalization of
BHUs as the starting point of the contracting period.
Including an additional indicator reflecting incomplete con-
tracting does not yield significantly different result.
10. In the PSLM survey BHUs and Rural Health Centers
(RHC) are grouped together.
11. Normalized differences are a scale free measure that does
not mechanically inflate with sample size. Wooldridge
et al. (2009) find that normalized differences below 0.25
imply little sensitivity of linear regression method due to
specification changes (Wooldridge et al. 2009).
12. The wealth index is estimated within each survey wave
and uses information on the ownership of household dur-
able goods e.g. electronic goods, furniture, transport and
housing conditions.
13. We prefer OLS because the identifying assumptions of
DiD with non-linear estimates differ from the parallel
trends assumption in a linear setting (Puhani 2012).
Results from non-linear models resulted in very similar
impact estimates compared to those reported in the paper
and are available from the authors upon request.
14. Poverty is defined as belonging to the poorest 20% of
the population based on a survey-specific wealth index.
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